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Abstract
Labor market policies succeed or fail at least in part depending on how well they
reflect or account for behavioral responses. Insights from behavioral economics,
which allow for realistic deviations from standard economic assumptions about
behavior, have consequences for the design and functioning of labor market policies.
We review key implications of behavioral economics related to procrastination,
difficulties in dealing with complexity, and potentially biased labor market
expectations for the design of selected labor market policies including
unemployment compensation, employment services and job search assistance, and
job training.
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Background and motivation
The Great Recession of 2007 to 2009 and its aftermath have been a trying period for
American workers. The U.S. unemployment rate reached double digits in late 2009 for
the first time in over a quarter of a century and has remained over 8 percent through
mid-2012. Real compensation growth has all but stalled. The human costs of labor
market turbulence have rarely been clearer, and the value of public policies, such as
unemployment insurance and job training programs, that assist workers in managing
that turbulence, gaining new skills, and navigating the labor market have rarely been
more apparent. Similar problems of persistent joblessness have been apparent in most
major economies in recent years.
Even in the best of times, the United States’ labor market is a dynamic and turbulent
one with high rates of turnover (over five million separations and five million new
hires in a typical month in normal times) but substantial frictions as well. As a result,
labor market programs and regulations are key components of economic policy. Such
policies help support the unemployed, provide education and training opportunities,
and ensure the fairness, safety, and accessibility of the workplace. The challenge for
policymakers in the United States and elsewhere is to design such policies so that they
meet these goals as effectively and as efficiently as possible.
Labor market policies succeed in meeting their objectives, however, only to the ex-
tent that they accurately account for how individuals actually make decisions about
work and leisure, job search, and education and training. To a substantial extent such
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are perfectly rational, time consistent, and entirely self-interested. The design of un-
employment insurance with job search requirements intended to minimize distortions
to incentives to return to work, the use of complicated eligibility criteria and adminis-
trative hassle factors to discourage social program participation except for the pre-
sumed most needy, and the shift to vouchers for training services have all been justified
by these assumptions.
However, recent research at the intersection of psychology and economics—behavioral
economics—is changing our understating of how individuals choose and act, and with
it, some of our conclusions for policy design (Rabin 1998; Thaler and Sunstein
2008; Congdon, Kling, and Mullainathan 2011). Behavioral economics stresses empirical
findings of behavior that are partially at odds with standard economic assumptions. The
key empirical findings from field research in behavioral economics imply that individuals
can make systematic errors or be put off by complexity, that they procrastinate, and that
they hold non-standard preferences and non-standard beliefs (DellaVigna 2009). To the
extent that these behavioral tendencies operate in labor market contexts, they may change
both our understanding of the challenges that policy design must meet, as well as the op-
portunities and design tools available to policymakers.
In these notes, we briefly review selected topics in labor market policy through the
lens of behavioral economics. We identify aspects of U.S. policy design that appear at
odds with behavioral findings, as well as unrealized policy opportunities those findings
suggest. The results of this review are prescriptions for policy design and innovation
that reflect a synthesis of traditional and behavioral economic insights. We consider
the implications of behavioral findings in three areas: unemployment insurance, job
search assistance, and job training. Although we focus on the specifics of U.S. labor
market policies, the lessons we draw potentially have broader applicability.
Some of the implications of behavioral economics for policy are overlooked in trad-
itional formal economic analysis but reflect what might best be called “common sense”
and are similar to the critiques and prescriptions of many long-time policy practitioners
and analysts. These include recommendations to minimize the fragmentation and com-
plexity of job training, employment, and social welfare programs. The behavioral ap-
proach also reinterprets traditional labor market policy proposals by taking into account
loss aversion and potentially biased wage expectations, particularly relevant considerations
in the case for and the design of wage-loss insurance policies. Behavioral findings from
other domains generate new insights critical to the choice architecture and choice plat-
forms for helping unemployed and disadvantaged workers navigate training and education
options (Thaler and Sunstein 2008).
Unemployment compensation
Providing income support for the unemployed while encouraging their speedy return
to work is a primary goal for labor policy. The ability of individuals (and even of many
extended families) to self-insure, to smooth income and consumption out of savings
and transfers from relatives and friends, is limited in the face of job losses and poten-
tially extended spells of unemployment. Furthermore, private markets may fail to pro-
vide adequate mechanisms, such as loans, because of asymmetries of information. Our
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reemployment is unemployment insurance (UI).
From the standard economic viewpoint, the main design challenge for UI is moral
hazard. UI policies must balance the provision of liquidity and support for consumption
smoothing during unemployment against the tendency of such benefits to distort
incentives to search for and take new employment (Baily 1978; Chetty 2008). Increases
in the generosity of benefits, either through increases in benefit levels or the duration
of benefits, appear to lengthen the unemployment spells of unemployment insurance
recipients (Meyer 1990; Katz and Meyer 1990).
In the United States, UI is a program administered jointly by the federal government
and the states that replaces a substantial fraction of a qualified individual’s lost wages
when she becomes unemployed (through no fault of her own) and while she looks for
new work. Ordinarily benefits can be collected for a maximum of six months
(26 weeks), although this limit is often relaxed during national economic downturns by
Congress through discretionary federal UI extensions. Longer potential benefit dura-
tions (extended benefits) can also be triggered at the state level in response to state-
specific adverse economic shocks. The maximum duration of unemployment benefits
in the highest unemployment states was extended by the U.S. Congress to 99 weeks in
the depths of the Great Recession through the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act in 2009. Various reauthorizations kept the 99 week maximum through early 2012.
Related programs and variants include wage-loss insurance, personal reemployment
accounts, reemployment bonuses, and subsidies to continue health insurance coverage
following job loss.
U.S. unemployment benefits are contingent on active job search efforts (job search
requirements) and benefits are strictly time limited in part to address the potential for
moral hazard. Time-limited UI benefits can be interpreted as a crude version of the key
implication of the Shavell and Weiss (1979) standard model of optimal unemployment
insurance that benefits should decrease with duration of unemployment to provide ap-
propriate search incentives. There has been some experimentation with the terms of
unemployment compensation to further promote reemployment including the use of
reemployment bonuses, variation in the intensity of monitoring job search, and the
provision of job search assistance and self-employment assistance. But such efforts have
to date generated only mixed results (Meyer 1995; Black et al. 2003).
The behavioral economics of unemployment compensation
Behavioral economics suggests several other psychological barriers to job search dis-
tinct from moral hazard. One set of barriers arises from the way in which individuals
form expectations about wages and evaluate their employment prospects. Behavioral
economics introduces the possibility that individuals will form such expectations with
error or systematic bias, and are likely to be “loss averse” in evaluating job offers asym-
metrically around those expectations (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). These effects may
operate to slow their return to work and reinforce the moral hazard problems in un-
employment compensation schemes of unemployed workers not putting in adequate
search efforts and setting inefficiently high reservation wages in response to more gen-
erous benefits while unemployed.
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duals to have imperfect self-control, such as expressed by time inconsistent preferences
(Laibson 1997). As a result, individuals may procrastinate in their job search efforts
even when such delay is against their own, long-run self-interest. These considerations
complicate the moral hazard problem by creating potential conflicts between an un-
employed individual’s current and future selves as well as the standard conflict between
the benefits of the recipient and the program operators. These factors generate a situ-
ation where stronger work and job search requirements that appear overly paternalistic
in the usual model of homo economics may actually benefit the program participants
themselves by helping them overcome self-control problems.
These behavioral factors change the central challenge associated with providing efficient
unemployment insurance in at least two ways. First, in addition to balancing the insurance
value of unemployment compensation against the social costs of any associated moral
hazard, optimal unemployment insurance with behavioral agents must also consider the
welfare implications of decision-making errors or biases (Spinnewijn 2010). Second,
incentives in UI programs may need to account for behavioral tendencies, such as loss
aversion or time inconsistency, to operate effectively.
Reform proposal: Implement some form of wage loss insurance
Individuals return to work when they get a job offer paying above their reservation
wage. In standard theory, individuals are assumed to form reservation wages in a ra-
tional manner incorporating unbiased expectations of market wages and an accurate
assessment of the market value of their skills. As a result of the behavioral tendencies
outlined above, however, unemployed individuals may be reluctant to entertain and
slow to accept even objectively reasonable wage offers. The current structure of un-
employment insurance and related programs does not address this tendency, but the ef-
ficiency of these programs may suffer because of it. Individuals holding out for offers that
will not come remain on the unemployment insurance roles for inefficiently long periods.
Of particular concern is the possibility that individuals will set their reservation wage at
the level of wages they have received on past jobs, whether or not this is realistic given
prevailing labor market conditions (Feldstein and Poterba 1984; Ball and Moffitt 2001;
Hogan 2004). Moreover, individuals might be loss averse in the sense of having prefer-
ences that are asymmetric around their previous wage with a particularly large psycho-
logical cost to taking a job paying below their past earnings. The combined effect might
be to lead individuals to be irrationally reluctant to accept job offers below their pre-
separation wage, to be unwilling to relocate to areas with greater labor market opportun-
ities, and to search mainly for jobs like their previous one or to pass up reasonable
opportunities while waiting for their old job (or one just like it) to return. This phenomenon
has been called “retrospective wait unemployment” and is particularly important for long-
tenured workers displaced from high-wage sectors in decline such as autos and steel
(Summers 1986; Balls et al. 1991). It is reinforced by the social status and personal iden-
tities of many workers being strongly tied to their previous jobs.
A policy to address these issues and supplement UI for likely permanent job losers is
wage-loss insurance (also called wage insurance) which (at least temporarily) subsidizes
worker earnings upon reemployment when the wage they receive on their new job is
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insurance, such as the ability to better target benefits to those workers who face the
most severe consequences of job loss (Kletzer and Litan 2001; Kling 2006). Although
behavioral economics does not change that logic, it does identify additional advantages
to wage-loss insurance. By manipulating the realized value of wages (especially if the
wage-loss insurance payments show up directly in one’s regular paycheck) and making
job offers more attractive, it averts to some degree the impacts of biased wage expecta-
tions and mitigates the effects of loss aversion. In the longer run, it may smooth the
painful but sometimes necessary process of psychological adjustment to lower-wage
employment. Consideration of wage-loss insurance proposals should weigh these be-
havioral advantages, and any demonstration projects or evaluations of wage-loss insur-
ance, such as that currently being conducted as part of the U.S. Trade Adjustment
Assistance program, should take care to test for the possible importance of these
behavioral dimensions.
In addition to providing further justifications for existing wage-loss proposals, behav-
ioral factors also generate specific design recommendations. For example, the effects of
biased wage expectations or reference dependence with respect to those expectations call
into question the likely efficacy of partial wage insurance at speeding up returns to work
for displaced workers. These behavioral concerns are consistent with the limited impacts
on reemployment rates and job search efforts found in a Canadian demonstration project
testing partial-replacement wage insurance for displaced workers (Bloom et al. 2001). An
alternative might be to structure wage-insurance as full or nearly full insurance upon
reemployment, and declining over time possibly in a manner linked to typical wage
growth patterns on new jobs. Of course, the benefits of such a redesign in mitigating the
effects of biased wage expectations and loss aversion must be weighed against the possible
costs it might impose on targeting and allocative efficiency.
Research agenda: Experiment with incentive schemes in unemployment compensation
Limits to self-control represent another likely behavioral barrier to creating incentives to
return to work in unemployment compensation programs. A key design challenge for UI
is to provide temporary income support while maintaining the incentives of the un-
employed to search for and return to work. Procrastination and other expressions of
bounded self-control complicate that problem substantially. Findings that the unemployed
spend only a modest amount of time per week searching for work are consistent with
such procrastination (Krueger and Mueller 2010). Much suggestive evidence indicates
that many job seekers may have time inconsistent preferences and tendencies to procras-
tinate in job search efforts (DellaVigna and Paserman 2005; Paserman 2008). The effects
of benefit design on search intensity are thus not simply a product of financial payments
from continued unemployment, but instead a more subtle interaction between benefits,
incentives, and willpower. Particularly problematic for policy, these tendencies may serve
to blunt the force of design features intended to align incentives. The result is that work
incentives in programs like UI must address both moral hazard as well as procrastination.
That the work incentive problem in UI may take on this different character when
allowing for behavioral tendencies such as procrastination suggests an agenda of ex-
perimentation with the structure of unemployment benefits. Demonstration projects
Babcock et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy 2012, 1:2 Page 5 of 14
http://www.izajolp.com/content/1/1/2experimenting with changes to the UI compensation structure have a long history. Past
efforts have included reemployment bonus experiments and a demonstration of
Personal Reemployment Accounts (PRAs) (Meyer 1995; Kirby et al. 2008). However, eva-
luations of these efforts have yielded somewhat mixed results. This may be in part due to
the failure of these projects to consider factors such as bounded self-control. For example,
reemployment bonuses, contingent as they are on possibly distant outcomes such as gain-
ing reemployment and holding the new job for at least several months, may provide little
in the way of an effective incentive to individuals who choose levels of search effort day to
day.
Behavioral economics suggests new directions for experiments with alternative incen-
tive schemes in unemployment insurance and related programs that recognize the role
of self-control in returning to work. One direction that appears promising would be to
offer small, immediate, and high frequency reminders and incentives to search. So in-
stead of tying rewards and penalties to large, distant, low frequency objectives, such as
regaining employment for a significant duration of time, unemployment insurance
might tie rewards and penalties to smaller, higher frequency objectives, such as making
a specific number of active employer contacts in a week. Other candidates for testing
are incentives that trigger avoidance of anticipated regret, and rewards with lottery-like
characteristics, which have been effective in the presence of self-control problems in
other contexts (Volpp et al. 2008). Another direction for experimentation entirely
would be to test the possibility of overcoming imperfect self-control by creating a
principal-agent relationship in which placement agents receive the bonuses. Key issues
that will need to be addressed in the design of such policies using employment inter-
mediaries are limiting cream skimming incentives (which arise if the intermediaries can
“choose” their clients) and making sure that payments to intermediaries are tied to
longer-term employment and earnings outcomes rather than only to short-term reem-
ployment rates and use of services (Autor and Houseman 2010; Heinrich and Choi 2007).
Employment services and job search assistance
Labor market policies can play an important role in assisting individuals with the job
search process. Basic employment services, such as the coordination of job listings by
the public employment services in many nations, seek to provide a public good both to
workers and to employers. More active job search assistance policies essentially provide
a form of human capital to workers in improving their job search skills and labor mar-
ket information. The overarching goal of such programs is to help individuals return to
work quickly and to improve the quality of matches between workers and jobs.
In the United States a portfolio of interconnected programs supports this goal, and
includes informational services as well as active job search assistance. Public employ-
ment services – The Employment Service (ES) – provide placement assistance to both
workers and employers, maintains labor exchange listings, and performs outreach to
employers. Services provided under the U.S. Workforce Investment Act (WIA) include
counseling and assistance for job seekers. Workers obtain access to these services
through multiple points of entry, one of the most important of which are worker profil-
ing referrals from the UI system. These services are supported by employment data and
projections complied by the U.S. Department of Labor and its state partners.
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ture are typically effective at helping individuals to obtain employment more rap-
idly, and, largely as a result, can raise earnings at least in the short-run (LaLonde 1995;
O’Leary 2004). Positive impacts have been found for most types of these services, includ-
ing employment services and job search assistance, and for most populations who use
them, including those on UI as well as the economically disadvantaged including partici-
pants in welfare-to-work programs. Because such services are relatively inexpensive to
provide on a per participant basis, they are usually found to be cost effective.
The behavioral economics of employment services and job search assistance
Behavioral tendencies may help to explain the consistent effectiveness of employment
services and job search assistance. The behavioral barriers to search described above—
biases and error in setting wage expectations, procrastination in searching for work,
and so on—suggest a role for this assistance. To the extent that formal assistance can
ameliorate or overcome these problems, these policies will speed reemployment.
In addition, there are behavioral barriers to job search that arise simply due to the
fact that it is an intrinsically difficult problem. Optimal job search requires considering
information about job market conditions and how they match with personal character-
istics in a way that is likely to be difficult for imperfectly rational individuals. Behavioral
economics stresses that individuals are limited in the attention and the computational
capacity they can bring to multifaceted and complex problems (Tversky and Shafir 1992;
Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Iyengar and Lepper 2000). As a result, the speed and quality
of employment matches may both suffer due to the tendency of fallible individuals to
manage the complex tasks of job search. And programs that assist individuals with man-
aging that complexity can help them obtain work.
These behavioral dimensions to job search change our understanding of the chal-
lenges faced by employment services and job search assistance programs. The behav-
ioral perspective implies employment programs need to operate directly on the aspects
of individual decision-making that might lead to privately inefficient search and match
their design to the biases they hope to correct. For example, it may be insufficient to
simply make job market information available. Program effectiveness may be enhanced
by actively seeking to debias expectations, ensure the understanding of labor market in-
formation, and provide incentives to combat procrastination in job search.
Policy proposal: Simplify and expand employment services and job search assistance
Searching for jobs may be more difficult for individuals than the standard model typic-
ally allows. Looking for work is, in the first place, a substantial information problem.
Workers have to understand labor market conditions, have knowledge of openings and
applications processes, possess an accurate understanding of their own skill level and
how firms and markets might value those skills, and determine the quality of matches
with employers. Moreover, searching for work requires willpower, which can be costly
for individuals to draw upon. Workers may be tempted to procrastinate in their job
search efforts in favor of other activities. Well-designed employment services and job
search assistance programs have the potential to assist with both of these issues.
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cess to employment services or job search assistance is likely to be worthwhile. Evi-
dence suggests that individuals are bad at knowing that job search is effective, that is,
that they underestimate the benefits of search (Spinnewijn 2010), which may result in
individuals choosing a lower than optimal level of search. Policies might thus seek to
promote enrollment in these activities beyond what individuals would choose on their
own, for example, by increasing the instances in which individuals can be defaulted into
such services, such as through worker profiling upon signing up for UI. Default
required job search activities might help individuals to overcome any tendency to pro-
crastinate search. Evidence that individuals can be encouraged to take jobs just by en-
rolling them in job search programs—that individuals are encouraged to take jobs
either very early into such programs or before such programs even begin—is consistent
with this hypothesis (Director and Englander 1998; Black et al. 2003). But one does also
need to take into account the potential displacement (or spillover) effects of job search
assistance for targeted groups of the unemployed on the outcomes of other job seekers
for a full evaluation of the impacts of such policies (Crépon et al. 2012).
Another proposal is to simplify and streamline the experience of workers seeking em-
ployment services or job search assistance. Employment and job search assistance tools
should be widely available and easy to use, both online and in public employment ser-
vice offices (or in U.S. One-Stop Career Centers). These tools could gather information
on an individual’s background and interests, provide feedback on the education and
employment opportunities pursued by others like them, list job openings they may be
interested in, and provide information on the projected growth in occupations and in
other local areas in an easily accessible manner.
In addition to simplifying the process of obtaining assistance, employment service ac-
tivities should also present information on local labor market conditions and occupa-
tional projections with an eye to how it will be construed by recipients, not just what
information it contains. For example, it is one thing to say that a certain sector is
expanding or contracting but probably a different level of information transmission to
convey what it means to be in that sector and incorporate this information into labor
exchange systems. That is, policy should seek not only to improve the precision of in-
formation like occupational projections, but also the way in which that information is
conveyed to individuals. Information should be simple and personalized.
Research agenda: Study methods of presenting job search information
Employment services and job search assistance face behavioral barriers to their effective-
ness beyond the difficulties individuals may have with the complexity or the willpower
requirements of job search. Most prominently, the systematic biases or reference depend-
ence related to previous earnings that unemployed individuals may exhibit with respect to
wage expectations can remain an impediment to seeking and accepting work. Job search
assistance can potentially work to address the biases, frames, or other cognitive obstacles
to employment because it represents an opportunity for policy to influence how indivi-
duals understand the possibilities before them in the job market. Behavioral economics
suggests that the way in which job opportunities are framed can matter for how indivi-
duals respond to choices. This suggests a research agenda to experiment with
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makers can innovate in the way that employment services are presented to individuals.
One area for research and experimentation is the potential of using the presentation of
information or counseling that can be part of job search assistance programs to debias
wage expectations. There are good reasons to think that one behavioral barrier to job
search and employment is that individuals may have biased wage expectations. Evidence
from other contexts suggests that debasing of such beliefs is possible through carefully
designed interventions (Babcock, Lowenstein, and Issacharoff 1997). This research sug-
gests that having people question their own judgment by explicitly considering counterar-
guments to their own thinking can be effective. Job search assistance could potentially
incorporate such an exercise with respect to wage expectations. There has been some
comparative effectiveness type research on job search assistance, testing the relative suc-
cess of differently structured job search assistance programs (Decker et al. 2000). Research
into wage expectations debasing could follow a similar path.
There is also scope for research into other aspects of the presentation of employment
services information or job search assistance. The presentation and context of this in-
formation can potentially invoke frames of loss or gain, emotions such as anger or sad-
ness, different propensities toward risk taking, and so on. This framing can affect
choices not by overcoming biases or behavioral tendencies but by working within their
limits. One promising area of study involves manipulations to the way job search assist-
ance is framed for participants. Framing consequences as losses instead of gains, for ex-
ample, is known to affect behavior in other contexts (Rothman et al. 2006). This
framing can also affect the willingness of participants to take risks, such as the risk of
interviewing for or starting a new job. Framing might also be used to attempt to influ-
ence the reference points around which individuals judge alternatives and thereby im-
pact attitudes toward job opportunities.
Job training
Another important set of labor market policies is concerned with providing access to op-
portunities to acquire and upgrade skills and earning power. Public support for job train-
ing can be viewed as a response to positive externalities to human capital acquisition or in
helping individuals overcome capital market imperfections, much as with education
investments more generally. Such policies can also serve to address distributional con-
cerns, for example as part of the compensation and safety net that society provides to
those dislocated by trade or technology. A primary operational challenge for job training
policy is to deliver these benefits in a well-targeted and efficient manner.
The current centerpiece of U.S. public-sector job training program efforts is the
Workforce Investment Act (WIA). WIA offers occupational skills training and on-the-
job training programs to both dislocated and disadvantaged workers. Services are deliv-
ered through One-Stop Career Centers, and funds are provided in Individual Training
Accounts (ITAs), which workers draw on to purchase training services from various
providers, such as community colleges. Other major supports for job training include
Pell Grants, which low-income workers can use to fund educational programs that lead
to a certificate or degree, and the Lifetime Learning Credit, which is a nonrefundable
tax credit available to offset educational expenses.
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grams that support job training for mid-career individuals have a mixed record of ef-
fectiveness (Greenberg, Michalopoulos, and Robins 2003). In part, this reflects the
heterogeneity of both programs of this type as well as the populations they serve. His-
torical evidence suggests that some participants, in particular adult women, benefit
consistently from job training, in the form of improved earnings, while others, includ-
ing adult men, often do not. Benefits to specific training programs, where evident, are
typically small in absolute terms and evidence about their persistence is scattered. A
key caveat in interpreting this evidence is most of the evaluations cover training pro-
grams that are not intensive, are of short duration, and are not very different from the
substitute education and training programs utilized by members of the control group.
Some evidence shows that more intensive training treatments, such as completing
courses leading to a certificate or degree at a community college, generate substantial
improvements in earnings (Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 2005). The direct evidence
on WIA training services is in the form of non-experimental work, and is inconclusive
(Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske 2008; Hollenbeck et al. 2005).
The behavioral economics of job training
Behavioral economics suggests that the disappointing results of some job training pro-
grams may be due in part to a failure of such programs to respond accurately to the
psychology of workers who could benefit from training. Results from behavioral eco-
nomics suggest that the determination of whether and when to undertake job training,
the selection of a field to be trained in as well as a provider, and the pursuit and com-
pletion of that training, represents an intrinsically challenging sequence of choices and
actions for imperfectly rational individuals. As noted above, research shows that indivi-
duals often fail to choose “optimally” in such settings and can have difficulty exerting
self-control in starting up and persisting in investment activities with distant payoffs. A
successful workforce investment system is likely to be one that reduces complexity and
the need for willpower from the perspective of workers, and relies less heavily on well-
informed, patient participants for its smooth operation and success.
The key differences implied by the presence of behavioral tendencies for job training pol-
icy are likely to be twofold. First, policy must contend with the fact that accessing and fol-
lowing through with training may be difficult for many individuals. This creates a challenge
not only to serving the optimal number of beneficiaries, but also for efficiently targeting
benefits. Standard economic models imply that hassle factors, stigmatizing application pro-
cesses, and other costs to accessing programs may improve the targeting of programs by
screening out those with low expected benefits and self-selecting into programs those indi-
viduals who rationally assess the benefits to be most valuable (Parsons 1991). But when
there is heterogeneity in the extent to which individuals’ behavior departs from standard
economic assumptions, these hurdles to program entry and to eligibility certification and
recertification may generate inefficient screening leaving the most vulnerable (who are the
least able to navigate such processes) behind (Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Shafir 2004).
Second, imperfectly optimizing individuals create an additional layer of challenges for pro-
viding job training services through market-based mechanisms, a potentially efficient way to
deliver such benefits for standard rational economic actors. But if individuals choose only
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the resulting market pressures may produce behavior that strays further from optimal out-
comes. Market mechanisms in this context should be designed to be robust to such imper-
fect decision making by beneficiaries.
Policy proposal: Simplify job training services
Existing U.S. job training programs are typically not focused on being easy to use from
the participant’s perspective. Past efforts to streamline services have mainly emphasized
administrative efficiency, rather than the experience of the user. Programs remain
somewhat fragmented and can be complicated to access and navigate. Moreover, in re-
cent decades, U.S. job training policy has moved from publicly-provided job training
services to a model of providing individuals access to funding to pursue their own
choice of training opportunities in a marketplace of competing providers. Although this
shift in focus has potential benefits, it also places a burden on workers that they may
be ill equipped to manage and which may impair program effectiveness. This burden
may impact participants differentially, raising the possibility that the very individuals
who might benefit most from training may have the most difficulty in obtaining it.
One set of policy recommendations that follow from these observations is that it should
be an explicit goal of WIA to provide job training services in a manner that is streamlined
from the perspective of prospective users. Job training services in WIA should seek to
minimize barriers to take-up. These programs should also take active steps to ensure that
program requirements are not, in practice, most onerous for those individuals most in
need. In addition, training programs provided through One-Stop Career Centers should
emphasize reducing complexity and providing guidance to participants as priorities. One
method for providing guidance would be to enhance the counseling services that accom-
pany ITA receipt, although previous experimentation along these has not been promising
(McConnell et al. 2006). Another approach would be to institute rules (such as developing
appropriate default options) or tailor program parameters (such as ITA value) in such a
way so as to better direct choice. A further option currently being tested is the integration
within One-Stop Career Centers of both guidance on training and education options as
well as help in accessing and understanding available financial work supports (e.g., the
Earned Income Tax Credit and child care subsidies) and social assistance programs (e.g.,
food stamps) (Miller, Tessler, and van Dok 2009).
A similar set of recommendations also applies to job training services available out-
side of WIA. On the one hand, access to these services, such as Pell grants, should be
simplified. Current proposals to simplify the form and application process for federal
student aid are consistent with this goal (Dynarski and Scott-Clayton 2008). Likewise,
the Lifetime Learning Credit could possibly be more effective if structured as a match.
On the other hand, programs such as these should be integrated with WIA services to
the greatest extent possible. For example, where not already the case, Pell recipients en-
rolled at a community college should receive services through the associated One-Stop
Career Center. The One-Stop system is many ways the right model on which to build,
but policy should reflect a renewed emphasis on the ease of use from the perspective of
participants. Available qualitative evidence supports that idea that integrating services
is likely to improve the participant experience (Barnow and King 2005).
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continued experimentation with job training policies that require less active decision-
making on the part of participants. Examples include the support of employer-provided
incumbent worker training, or of other demand-side programs that directly fund train-
ing services in high-wage and expanding industries.
Research proposal: Experiment with choice platforms for job training advice
A different model for ensuring that individuals qualifying for job training services
receive effective guidance and assistance would be to experiment with creating a
structured market for providers of counseling and advice. The current system of
training assistance, both through ITAs under WIA and through funds available
through student financial aid or tax credits, is built upon markets for training
services in which providers such as community colleges and proprietary schools
compete for training dollars. The idea behi n dt h i sa p p r o a c hi st h a tp a r t i c i p a n t s
will apply competitive pressure on training providers to offer effective services.
But the complexity of the choices involved limits the capacity of individuals to
drive these markets toward such outcomes. In other contexts such as the pre-
scription drug plan choices by the elderly under Medicare Part D and public
school choice programs, behavioral economics research has found that a large
number of complex choices hinders decision-making and that interventions pro-
viding personalized and transparent information on the most “relevant” choices
can improve decision-making outcomes (Kling et al. 2012; Hastings and Weinstein 2008).
Thus, there is some reason to believe that similar efforts could bear fruit with respect to
job training.
Job training policy should experiment with the creation of new markets for job train-
ing advice in order to improve the capacity of individuals to make good choices about
providers of job training services, and, ultimately, improve the operation of the market
for job training services. Such an approach would operate by creating a market in
which providers of counseling and advice competed to serve individuals. The key would
be that the success or failure of those providing counseling and advice would be deter-
mined by objective measures of their performance.
Practical considerations for making such a proposal work would be paramount,
and so experimentation is necessary. Competition could be structured so that firms
doing well in providing advice and counseling according to workforce performance
measures gain market share. Individuals registering for training would be referred
to one of several providers of counseling. More effective providers will be given
progressively more referrals, by reallocating the flow of beneficiaries over time,
while ineffective providers will see their client base decrease. Considerable atten-
tion would need to be devoted to preventing selection of particular trainees by
providers. Referrals could be assigned randomly, or on a rotational basis, to allow
direct comparisons of the average performances of different providers (Bartik 1995).
Finally, to avoid conflicts of interest, it would also be necessary that these intermediaries
have no connection to the underlying service providers. A regulatory firewall could pro-
hibit financial ties between providers and employers with whom individuals are placed, to
solidify the counselors’ role as honest brokers. It could be possible for government and
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person served.
Finally, note that any innovation of this nature would be dependent for its success on
the WIA performance measurement system. There is a good deal of evidence that the
existing system is inadequate to such a task, and there are a number of proposals for
improvement (Jacobson 2009). These efforts would be complementary to efforts to
build an effective choice platform for advice markets.
Conclusion
A review of the intersection of behavioral economics and current U.S. labor market pol-
icies suggest specific policy reforms and motivates demonstration and evaluation projects
in areas where greater knowledge is needed. We have noted potential reforms and prom-
ising research projects in the domains of unemployment compensation, job search assist-
ance, and job training. Although these are only a few selected applications, they
demonstrate the promise of a behavioral approach to labor market policy. Realizing this
promise more fully is an important goal for future research.
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